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CHECKPOINT IRAQ: A TACTIC THAT WORKS
WASHINGTON POST - MARCH 2005
ANBAR PROVINCE, Iraq: As an unembedded freelance journalist in Iraq, I
have safely driven through scores of American roadblocks all over this
country. I have also spent many hours with American troops as they set
up and operate these checkpoints.
At the same time, like other reporters here who don't travel with armies
of their own -- and like the millions of Iraqis who either have some
money or are brave enough to participate in their country's
reconstruction -- I live constantly with the fear of being kidnapped. We
see every day the damage done with the millions of dollars that Iraq's
Baathist and Wahhabist insurgencies make from that appalling business.
So as investigators try to sort out how U.S. troops could have fired on a
car carrying newly freed Italian journalist Giuliana Sgrena, wounding her
and killing the man who secured her release, I'm thinking about how
checkpoints save lives. We don't know exactly what happened at the
checkpoint on the way to the Baghdad airport. But I've seen how
checkpoints work, and the American soldiers who man them are anything
but trigger-happy. They know the consequences of making a mistake.
If the uproar over the shooting leads the Americans to further tighten
rules of engagement, that will increase the danger to our troops and
make commanders on the ground more reluctant to perform these
dangerous operations. As a result, more foreigners and Iraqis will be
running the risk of being kidnapped or blown up by suicide bombs.
Traffic checkpoints are an essential tactic in the disruption of terrorism
here in Iraq, since car bombers and kidnappers have to use the roads to
conduct their criminal business. Apart from certain fixed locations, such
as the entrances to the Green Zone or the Baghdad airport, most
checkpoints aren't permanent, and they can be set up almost anywhere,
in all sorts of situations. Bridges are popular with American commanders,
as they funnel traffic. Long highway straightaways are also good, since
they provide visibility for both the civilian drivers and the checkpoint
soldiers. Sometimes all the vehicles are searched, and sometimes just a
few of them.
Anything that makes it harder to spirit a hostage away to the countryside
forces urban kidnappers to keep their victims in busy areas, where the
likelihood of discovery is far higher. The restriction of movement provides
an important geographical focus for search efforts. Indeed, the first thing
that local authorities -- American or Iraqi -- do in a kidnap situation
here is set up checkpoints. Many times during kidnapping sagas, I've
heard Iraqis say things like, "Well, he's probably still in X, because with
all these checkpoints, they would never try to move him." For the
terrorists, the higher the likelihood of discovery, the less appealing the
kidnapping operation becomes.
The details of Sgrena's release and wounding are still in official dispute,
but on the street here there's nearly universal certainty that Nicola
Calipari, the Italian government agent who died at the checkpoint,
bought her with a large ransom. Some Italian officials have intimated as
much, though Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi told an Italian newspaper
that no money changed hands. It's also believed that the Italians
ransomed two aid workers last fall. If so, this would mean that the Italian
government is giving the terrorists money to conduct more violence even
as 2,700 young Italians in uniform are helping rebuild this country.
The word here is that although Calipari had briefed the Americans about
his mission, he withheld the details, partly because the Americans
disapprove of paying off kidnappers, but more importantly because of the
essential factor that foreign media coverage of Iraq usually ignores: the
Iraqis. If the Italians paid a ransom, Calipari committed a serious crime
in a sovereign state fighting desperately to establish the rule of law and
defeat internal terrorism.
Though we may never know exactly what happened, I find it hard to
believe that the Army's 3rd Infantry Division just opened fire at a car
being driven in a normal, unthreatening manner. The realities of
checkpoints in Iraq make random shooting at responsible drivers very
unlikely. I'm currently reporting a story on a unit of American soldiers.
They're drilled with a stopwatch in the task of setting up a checkpoint --
a "serpentine" of concertina wire, at least three orange cones and,
farthest out, a warning sign. These warning barriers are never forgotten,
because soldiers are scared of car bombs. The farther out a car has to
slow down, the better. You will never see disagreement within a platoon
over this basic fact of self-preservation.
Long before the Italian incident, orders had come down that deadly force
was to be used only as a last resort -- after the failure of obstacles,
then flares or smoke bombs or "star clusters," then warning shots, and
finally efforts to take out the oncoming vehicle's engine block. These
procedures are real. I have seen our soldiers' reluctance to use force and
felt the fear it brings. Car bombs cause 30 percent of military casualties.
The checkpoint procedures, which the military calls "fire discipline" and
"escalation of force," are designed to prevent soldiers from killing
innocent Iraqis who somehow lack the information or common sense to
slow down when they approach. Over the period of Sgrena's
incarceration, I stood with American troops at various checkpoints
between Fallujah and Ramadi in the Sunni heartland of Iraq's Wild West,
an area that receives more than 10 times the national average of attacks
on American forces. As I finished writing the previous sentence I heard
the announcement over the base radio that two members of the combat
team I was with had been killed -- by a suicide bomber driving up to a
checkpoint. I didn't see that explosion, but I heard it; I had spent much
of the day at another U.S. checkpoint not far away.
"Sitting ducks, that's all we are," a 20-year-old combat medic from Texas
said to me as we watched Iraqi vehicles thread past the "Alert" sign and
through the orange cones and concertina wire of a checkpoint last week.
Later, when I asked the sergeant in charge of the platoon if he was
enjoying himself, he responded, "Just hanging around waiting to get
blown up." This unit has suffered very high casualties, most from car
bombs. If any soldiers in Iraq could be expected to be jumpy and triggerhappy,
it is the grunts of central Anbar province. But as I watched them
run their checkpoint, both before and after the Sgrena incident, they
were thoroughly professional.
Driving around this country with Iraqis, including people with quite a lot
to hide, I've encountered scores of American checkpoints. Just about
everyone knows what to do: You do a slow U-turn and go the other way,
you find a route around, or you drive through slowly and wave at the
polite 20-year-old from Nashville. In a very small number of cases, one
side makes a mistake and something truly tragic happens.
As a foreigner here, I feel threatened by the possibility that the Italian
government may have rewarded the kidnappers. But Iraq is not about us
foreigners. It is about Iraqis. And it is Iraqis who suffer most from
kidnappings and from the transportation of the artillery shells and antitank
mines that become roadside devices and car bombs. Kidnapping
Iraqis has become an almost routine business transaction here. Local
businessmen fetch sums of up to $250,000, while the child of an ordinary
family might go for $5,000 or even $1,000. It happens all the time, all
over the country. Iraqi Christians, being more prosperous than most, are
especially victimized by this growing crime.
But since the Sgrena shooting, I've already sensed even greater
reluctance to set up these dangerous checkpoints. "The soldiers don't like
doing this, the NCOs don't like it, even the colonel doesn't like it," a
young officer told me the other day. "These checkpoints don't happen as
much as they used to."
Last summer, at the height of the kidnappings of foreign journalists here,
I used to go to bed every night imagining a cold kiss of steel on the back
of my neck: the first touch of the knife I feared would behead me. But
not anymore. Great strides have been made in Iraq, and the progress
continues every day. For law-abiding Iraqis, for reporters and for the
soldiers who risk their lives to disrupt the bombers and hostage-takers,
anything that makes life easier and more lucrative for the criminals is
very bad news.
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